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Grayson Giles (Amnesia)
Independent Systems Engineer & Architect · Security Researcher · Linux Distribution Maintainer
Email: amnesia@lainos.net
Co-copyright holder on the official Whonix Bridges wiki (with project founder adrelanos) · Contributor to QubesOS & Whonix
PGP Fingerprint: 456F 268D 14C9 ECCE 1A77 3558 03E8 F5B6 3BAC 3998
Lead Architect of lainOS layer 01, lainOS layer 02, the Protocol 7 System Architecture · Creator of VESME-avf
Independent security researcher and systems architect/engineer specializing in OS-level security, init-system architecture, and privacy-hardened Linux systems. Lead architect of LainOS and Protocol 7, a non-systemd compatibility layer that decouples modern Wayland desktops from systemd-era assumptions, currently in daily production use (RC4). Diagnosed and repaired critical Snowflake pluggable transport failures in Qubes-Whonix, restoring connectivity for 2,000+ daily users in censored regions; co-author in the official Whonix Bridges wiki. Creator of VESME, an experimental RAM-only secure messaging framework built on Android's Virtualization Framework.
Focused on sovereign computing, deterministic systems, and hardened isolation.
Core Projects
LainOS Layer 02 — OpenRC-Based Operating System
Role: Independent Systems & Security Engineer · Lead Architect & Maintainer
Repository: https://forgejo.lain.rocks/lainOS/lainOS-layer-02
LainOS Layer 02 is an OpenRC-based Systemd-free Linux operating system built around the Protocol 7 compatibility architecture and Arch Linux. It combines a minimal trusted computing base, a modern Wayland desktop, integrated privacy tooling, and distribution-specific administration utilities into a cohesive operating environment designed for daily and specialized use.
Key Contributions
- Designed and maintain LainOS Layer 02, an independent Linux operating system based on Arch Linux and OpenRC.
- Integrated the Protocol 7 architecture to provide compatibility with modern Linux desktop software without requiring systemd as PID 1.
- Built a complete desktop environment using Sway, greetd, PipeWire, Calamares, and distribution-specific tooling.
- Developed Layer 02 administration utilities for networking, Tor, privacy workflows, sdwdate management, memory hardening, and system configuration.
- Designed documented operational workflows for sensitive sessions, including automated privacy-mode sequencing and verification procedures.
- Integrated optional privacy technologies including Tor, Snowflake, obfs4, sdwdate, WireGuard, hardened_malloc, and secure desktop defaults.
- Maintain Layer 02 as a daily-use operating system, continuously improving usability, installation, documentation, and platform stability.
Technologies: Arch Linux · OpenRC · Wayland (Sway) · PipeWire · Tor · WireGuard · Calamares · C · Bash
Status: Active development · Release Candidate
Protocol 7 ~ Init-Agnostic systemd Compatibility Layer (LainOS Layer 02)
Role: Independent Systems & Security Engineer · Lead Architect & Maintainer Repository: https://forgejo.lain.rocks/lainOS/Protocol-7
This project was LLM assisted.
Architected and implemented a ~1,900-line C compatibility layer replacing systemd's PID 1, D-Bus session bridge, and notification daemon with OpenRC-based equivalents, enabling a full Wayland desktop stack (Sway, greetd, polkit, Calamares) to operate without systemd while retaining systemd-libs for ABI compatibility. Each daemon enforces a drop-privilege-then-seccomp model: root only for initial socket binding, immediate deprivilege to an unprivileged user, syscall allowlisting thereafter.
Security posture is verified, not asserted. Coverage includes dfuzzer against the full D-Bus method/property surface, libFuzzer at 2M+ iterations, AddressSanitizer, and Valgrind memcheck, with zero memory-safety findings across all four. Static analysis (cppcheck, semgrep) resolved the single real finding and correctly ruled out a second as a false positive. A manual, logic-focused review ~ the class of audit fuzzing cannot substitute for ~ identified a missing caller-identity check on a privileged D-Bus method; the gap was diagnosed, fixed, and verified through both allow- and deny-path testing prior to release.
Delivered a Calamares-based graphical installer integrated with a dracut live-boot chain, and a GPG-signed custom package repository (SigLevel = Required) for all custom components.
Technologies: C, libseccomp, D-Bus, OpenRC, dfuzzer, AddressSanitizer, libFuzzer, Valgrind, Calamares, Wayland (Sway)
Status: Active development, RC stage, in daily production use
LainOS — Privacy-Hardened Arch Linux (2022 – Present)
Role: Project Lead/Maintainer
Website: https://lainos.net
Repository: https://github.com/The-LainOS-Project
LainOS is a rolling-release Linux distribution based on Arch, focused on privacy, user sovereignty, and minimal trusted computing base.(layer 02)
Key Contributions
- Hardened kernel configuration and MAC randomization by default
- Maintained long-term rolling release stability
- Led distributed development team and SDLC process
VESME — Virtualized Ephemeral Secure Messaging Environment (2025)
Role: Architect & Lead Developer
Repository: https://gitlab.com/amnesia1337/vesme-avf
VESME is a secure messaging framework built on Android’s Virtualization Framework (AVF) and KVM, providing hardware-backed isolation for ephemeral communications.
Key Contributions
- Executed messaging stack inside isolated ephemeral VMs
- Integrated XMPP + OMEMO over Tor
- Implemented GPG-based authentication and secret handling
- Designed traffic obfuscation mechanisms
- Enabled user-initiated secure VM wipe
- Ported framework from aarch64 Debian to x86_64 Arch/lainOS (LESME)
Upstream Contributions
QubesOS & Whonix (2024)
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Snowflake Pluggable Transport: Diagnosed, repaired and optimized critical failures in the Snowflake bridge integration within Qubes-Whonix.
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Quantifiable Impact: Directly restored and maintained connectivity for 2,000+ daily active users in heavily censored regions (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan) who rely on Qubes-Whonix for high-assurance anonymity.
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Wiki Documentation: Co-copyright holder (with project founder adrelanos) for the official Whonix Bridges Wiki, serving as the primary technical resource for bridge configuration and troubleshooting. Credited as amnesia at boum dot org
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Upstream Integration: Credited with fixing the "outdated client" bug in
whonix-gatewaytemplates, ensuring modern Snowflake features (like AMP cache rendezvous) are functional.
References
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QubesOS Guide: https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/quick-start-guide-snowflake-proxy-in-qubes-whonix-tor-control-panel/28889
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Whonix Guide: https://forums.whonix.org/t/quick-start-guide-fix-snowflake-proxy-in-qubes-whonix-tor-control-panel/20377
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Whonix Bridges Wiki: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Bridges
Hardware-Rooted Security Work
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Provisioned Libreboot and Heads via external SPI flashing
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Implemented measured boot with TPM PCR sealing
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Verified firmware integrity using physical GPG tokens
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Neutralized Intel Management Engine during flashing
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Reduced TCB to auditable user-controlled components
Consulting & Applied Security (2017–Present)
Information Security Consultant and Technician providing privacy and security services for individuals and organizations.
Selected Work
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Built librebooted Qubes laptops and GrapheneOS devices
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Designed secure network infrastructure and routers (OpenWRT)
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Delivered QubesOS and mobile privacy training
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Implemented endpoint security solutions
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Built secure communication infrastructures
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Replaced invasive IoT systems with privacy-respecting alternatives
Blockchain Infrastructure & Security (2020–2022)
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Engineered hardened mining clusters with reduced attack surface
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Implemented VPN gateways and encrypted tunnels
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Deployed zero-trust management environment
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Designed cold storage and private key custody
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Conducted electrical and physical safety audits
Technical Skills
Programming
- Bash, Python
Systems & Security
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OS Architecture and Maintenance
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Security Analysis
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Security and Privacy Engineering
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Virtualization (KVM, Xen, AVF)
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Firmware security (Libreboot, Heads, TPM)
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Tor, PGP, encryption
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Hardened Networking
Engineering Practices
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SDLC management
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Manual QA and peer review
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Secure repository management
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Developer key management (GPG)
Community Engagement
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Contributor to open-source security projects
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Co-copyright holder on Whonix Bridges Wiki
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Active participant in Linux and privacy communities
PGP Fingerprint: 456F 268D 14C9 ECCE 1A77 3558 03E8 F5B6 3BAC 3998